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Biklé: Freedom of Speech
BOOK .EVIBEWS

BOOK REVIEWS.
FREEDOM.

OF

SPEECH.

By Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor of

Law in Harvard University, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe
1920. pp. vii, 431.
It is difficult to discuss judicially a subject so highly controversial
as "Freedom of Speech," and equally difficult to review, without
bias, a treatise on this subject presenting conclusions that vary from
those of the reviewer: the review bdcomes inevitably an exposition
of. the reviewer's favorite theories.
It has seemed expedient to make this statement at the outset, so
that it may be understood that the reviewer of this book is fully conscious of his owm bias, and asks indulgence if his review turns out
to be more a statement of his own ideas than a fair comment~upon
the theories of Professor Chafee.
The fundamental liberties enumerated in tfie early amendments
to the Federal Constitution are so generally taken for granted that
we easily forget that it has cost "much blood and sweat," as Mr.
Justice Holmes reminds us, to give them vitality. We hesitate to
believe that their foundations are threatened; and because of this
easy going assumption of security, a warning such as that sounded
by Professor Chafee is entitled to the most serious consideration.
In the judgment of the reviewer, the book loses none of this primary value from what must nevertheless be reckoned as a fault, viz.,
its very definite bias. Professor Chafee goes very far in his unwillingness to accept restriction of utterance. He seems to doubt the
constitutional test of the Supreme Court as announced by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Schenck Case, viz., "The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." He would allow no
restrictions on the right of free speech and free publication, except
such as might be regarded as illegal under the law governing solicitations and attempts. He says (pages 38-39), "Thus our problem
of locating the boundary line [that is, the constitutional line] of
free speech is solved..It is fixed close to the point where words will
give rise to unlawful acts." And yet he concedes (pages 170-171)
that, "A man who talks scurrilously about the flag commits a crime,
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not because the implications of his ideas tend to weaken the Federal
Government, but because the effect resembles that of an injurious
fact, such as trampling on the flag, which would be a public nuisance and a breach of the peace."
But it is clear, as Professor Chafee admits, that even the rule
which he advocates may be variously interpreted and applied. What
is meant by his word "close?"
And how are we to determine
whether words "will give rise to unlawful acts?" Professor Chafee
would seem strongly disposed to disregard the "tendency" of
words, and yet tendency must necessarily be considered if we are to
punish words "which will give rise to unlawful acts," unless the
illegality of such words is only to exist when they are successful.
We do not understand that Professor Chafee advocates such a rule
any more than a rule which would punish words inciting to crime
only in the event crime is committed.
The same indefiniteness inheres in Mr. Justice Holmes' test, since
intelligent persons will differ with one another as to whether words
create "a clear and present danger" of bringing about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. The matter, therefore, becomes a question of judgment, a fact that tends to explain
the bitterness of the controversy and the inconclusiveness of the discussions, since the application of the rule depends on the relative
emphasis given to the right of free speech as opposed to the duty of
obedience to law.
Tndoubtedly freedom of speech, while a recognized part of individual liberty, is important also because of its social value; but it
must be conceded that it involves social danger, since it may give
rise to unlawful acts or create a clear and present danger thereof.
The question of the restraint that should be applied becomes, therefore, a matter of individual opinion, except so far as the Constitution interposes legal barriers.
But Professor Chafee has intended and accomplished much more
than a discussion of the constitutional limitations upon legislation
affecting freedom of speech; and while the bias which seems apparent to this reviewer-probably because it differs from his ownleads to an unduly restrictive theory of the power of the state to
deal with utterance and writing, his advocacy of a liberal policy in
respect to freedom of discussion is developed with force and thoroughness.
However, it would have added to the value of the work if the
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author had been a little more judicial. Without perhaps any conscious purpose of doing so, he leaves the reader with the impression
that, in his judgment, all the persons punished under the Espionage Act and similar laws, were high-minded apostles of liberty,
grievously opposed by rigorous laws. There is also a tendency to lay
undue emphasis on minor matters, such as the light-hearted comments of Judge Clayton in the Abrams trial. Such an attitude on the
part of a judge is not inconsistent with the most careful and considerate administration of justice, as Mr. Justice Darling has shown
in England. And it sometimes has the merit of divesting a situation
of the theatrical importance which attorneys of a certain type seek
to throw around a case of public interest.
The author recognizes that the restrictions which may properly
be enforced in war time differ from those which are appropriate
in time of peace, not because the constitutional guaranty is in abeyance, but because in such a crisis words may create a clear and
present danger, which results from the circumstances under which
they are spoken; but he seems to find merit in the rhetorical suggestion of the Supreme Court in the Milligan Case, that a country
preserved at the sacrifice of the cardinal principles of liberty, is
not worth the cost of preservation. Of course this would be true if
the sacrifice were permanent, but since the liberties of the citizen
necessarily depend on the preservation of the government, it is
obvious that a temporary restriction of some phase of liberty may
be well worth while in order that liberty itself may be ultimately
and permanently preserved. The advocates of free speech insist that
error should be met with truth, and that time will destroy error,
but they overlook the fact that, when war is flagrant, issues cannot
abide the slow processes of time. Immediate and definite action is
essential in order to preserve the state.
Freedom of speech is only one phase of the liberty of the individual. That liberty is made up of many elements all of which are in
jeopardy of being irrevocably lost in the event of national defeat.
To insist on a relatively unlimited freedom of discussion in war
time is to disclose a lack of a sense of proportion-to jeopardize the
whole of in~dividual liberty for the sake of a part only. Nor is it fair,
to say that this begs the question, that it assumes the point in issue,
viz., whether, in the circumstances, speech is dangerous. This is a
question of fact, and a liberal should be willing that it be resolved
in accordance with those methods which are supposed to ascertain
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such facts and to give effect to what is "held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." It is too soon to forget the
denunciation of the courts for their failure to recognize such considerations where they have had under discussion the liberty of
minorities, involving other fundamental rights.
It will not do to refer to the great figures of the past who, having
disregarded the law, have led revolutions successfully. No one will
deny the indebtedness of the race to these men. But no government
can concede the right of revolution. It has been created to accomplish
certain ends and by virtue of the fact of its creation, it is endowed
with the right of self-preservation. The insistence on a single phase
of individual liberty such as freedom of speech, which is so ably
developed by Professor Chafee in this book, only serves to throw
into relief the attitude of those who, by seeking to maintain the
country, were endeavoring to preserve in permanence, not only
this heritage but also the heritage of the other liberties safeguarded
.n the Constitution. It need not alarm us if some punishments were
severe. A people that could maintain a calm and judicial attitude in
the crisis of a great war would never win it-they would not deserve to. "Some play must be allo-wed for the joints of the machine."
Professor Chafee has rendered a very real service in his thorough
exposition of the tendency to carry over the restrictive legislation
of the war into peace conditions. He will find far less disagreement
with his views here than with those which relate to the war emergency. There is every indication that these laws are rapidly falling
into disuse. Of course, it is of doubtful wisdom to carry on the
statute books laws that are not enforced, and clearly many of these
should be repealed.
The book includes an interesting chapter on "The Deportations,"
which are discussed almost wholly from the viewpoint of policy. The
suggestion that the complacent attitude of the country toward the
deportees was attributable to racial dislike overlooks, we believe,
the real reason. To the reviewer's mind, it seems clear that the explanation of this attitude on the part of the community is found
in the popular belief that the foreigner who comes to this country
and does not like what he finds here should get out. It is difficult
to see what just cause he has to complain of a situation into which
he has precipitated himself.
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The man into whose house a wayfarer has come for shelter from
a storm will have difficulty in sympathizing with his uninvited guest
if he begins complaining that the house is insufficiently heated and
the furniture uncomfortable. And the owner of the house will perhaps be pardoned for suggesting a departure if the stranger intimates the intention of pulling down the house and making it over
to suit himself.
Heeding the principles of the book, we have ventured to indulge
in a reviewer's freedom of speech, realizing that Professor Chafee
is estopped by his own principles from calling us to account for our
conclusions. But, in addition, the fine good humor with which he
has expounded his very definite views secures us, we know, his full
-Henry Wolf Bikl6.
dispensation.
Law School,
University of Pennsylvania.

CARLIN'S EDITION OF HOGG'S EQUITY PROCEDURE.-The QuAR-

is pleased to call the attention of the members of the Bar
to the revision of Ilogg's Equity Procedure. This work has been
done by Professor Leo Carlin of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
TERLY

NEW EDITION OF COAL, OIL, GAs, LIMESTONE AND IRON ORE
MAP.-The West Virginia Geological Survey has recently published this new map of valuable information and interest. The
QUARTERLY acknowledges receipt of a copy.

VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS.-.A collection of these important

decisions is for sale by one of our advertisers. The QUARTERLY
makes this mention because of the peculiar and historical interest
of this publication to members of the West Virginia Bar.
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